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INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND FRACKING 
DISASTERS: GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING UNDER A 
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS THEORY 
JOSEPH BELZA* 
Abstract: The practice of hydraulic fracturing, more commonly known as frack-
ing, risks a number of dangerous environmental consequences. Notably, fracking 
operations can contaminate the underlying water table. Contamination of ground-
water can disrupt the access of a nearby property to both potable drinking water 
and viable commercial irrigation. Usually, when a fracking operation results in this 
kind of groundwater contamination, affected plaintiffs sue the operator of the rig. 
This Note proposes that similarly situated plaintiffs also name a new defendant in 
these actions: the state agency that granted the fracking permit. The governmental 
actor could bear liability under a constitutional theory of inverse condemnation. 
Where contamination interferes with an individual’s use and enjoyment of property, 
the government actor bears responsibility for orchestrating the activity that caused 
the interference. In short, the government should be more discerning when granting 
permits to frack, because it can be held financially responsible for the fallout.  
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, hydraulic fracturing, colloquially known as “hydrofrack-
ing” or “fracking,” has prompted an energy revolution.1 This technique, used to 
extract fossil fuel from the earth, ballooned in popularity over the last decade, 
and that popularity has generated significant national controversy.2 Proponents 
of fracking point to its potential to create jobs and reduce United States depend-
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–
2017. 
 1 See John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case 
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 957, 966 (2015); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofrack-
ing and Home Rule: Defending and Defining an Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in 
New York, 77 ALB. L. REV. 647, 647 (2014); Shawn Tully, The Shale Oil Revolution is in Danger, 
FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/09/oil-prices-shale-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/
QF9Z-WNTX]. 
 2 Barbara H. Garavaglia, Hydraulic Fracturing: Sources of Law and Information, MICH B.J., 
Sept. 2013, at 58, 58; Golden & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 966. 
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ence on foreign oil as reasons for their support.3 Environmental opponents of the 
practice decry hydrofracking because of the risk of dangerous environmental 
consequences.4 They highlight evidence that fracking rigs contribute to green-
house gas emissions, create toxic air and water contamination, and trigger dan-
gerous seismic events.5 Environmentalists have had mixed success using legal 
techniques to block fracking operations around the country because of numerous 
political and legislative obstacles.6 Since 2014, a sustained drop in the price of 
oil on the global market has stalled the fracking boom; however the method re-
mains state-of-the-art and is likely here to stay.7 
Despite widespread concerns about the public health risks and environmen-
tal harms caused by hydrofracking, opponents of the practice find themselves 
with a limited legal toolkit.8 To some extent, opponents achieved success with 
new legislation banning fracking at the state level in New York and Vermont, 
and at more local levels in Colorado and California.9 These efforts are likely dif-
ficult to duplicate in many other parts of the country, where vocal political sup-
port for fracking precludes the success of such aggressive legislation.10  
                                                                                                                           
 3 W. McDonald Plosser, Note, Into the Fracking Fray: A Balanced Approach to Regulating Hy-
draulic Fracturing in Tennessee, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 673 (2014); Amanda Skalski, Note, Regu-
lating Hydraulic Fracturing in Michigan: The Protection of Our Waters and Our People Hits Another 
Roadblock, 14 J. L. SOC’Y 277, 278 (2013); Matt Willie, Comment, Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spot-
ty” Regulation: Why the Federal Government Should Let States Control Unconventional Onshore 
Drilling, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1743, 1747, 1749. 
 4 Hannah Coman, Note, Balancing the Need for Energy and Clean Water: The Case for Applying 
Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing Suits, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 135 (2012). 
 5 Coman, supra note 4, at 135; Mike Malfenttone, Comment, A Nation Fractured: Drilling into 
the Debate over Fracking, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1039, 1041 (2012); Carlos Romo & Colin 
Cox, Developments, Natural Resources, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 401, 402 (2015). 
 6 See William S. Friedlander, Poisoned Wells, TRIAL, Mar. 2011, at 16, 17, 20 (outlining petro-
leum industry carve-outs in the Safe Drinking Water Act, Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). 
 7 See Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A Development Lens for 
Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 229, 254 (2015); Leslie Carothers, 
Options for Regulating the Environmental Impacts Hydraulic Fracturing, [2015] 45 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,752, 10,754 n.19; Inessa Abayev, Note, Hydraulic Fracturing Wastewater: 
Making the Case for Treating the Environmentally Condemned, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 
275 (2013); David Wethe, Half of U.S. Fracking Companies Will Be Dead or Sold This Year, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-
22/half-of-u-s-fracking-companieswill-be-dead-or-sold-this-year [https://perma.cc/YAK7-E3CM]. 
 8 Friedlander, supra note 6, at 17, 20. 
 9 Colin C. Deihl et al., Tug of War over Colorado’s Energy Future: State Preemption of Local 
Fracking Bans, [2014] 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,524, 10,524; Edward S. Renwick, 
California, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 43, 48–49 (2015); Alexander T. Maur, Note, Let’s Not Frack This 
Up: State-Based Solutions for the Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing and the Disposal of Flowback 
Water, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 151, 160 (2015). 
 10 See Brian Weeks, Survey, New Jersey, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 185, 192–93 (2014) (printed in a 
separately paginated fifty state survey on hydraulic fracturing). For example, in 2011, the New Jersey 
state legislature passed an outright fracking ban similar to that of New York, but the law was vetoed 
by Republican Governor Chris Christie. See id. 
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Even when hydrofracking triggers environmental degradation and threatens 
public welfare, impacted communities can struggle to find success in the court-
room.11 In 2009, a group of lawsuits were filed in Dimock, Pennsylvania after a 
fracking accident caused widespread groundwater contamination.12 These suits 
are archetypical of how arduous and protracted litigation can be for communities 
impacted by fracking.13  
Dimock is a picturesque rural town in Susquehanna County.14 It is a town 
of wooded family homesteads, verdant forests, and a wildlife sanctuary.15 In 
2009, however, a hydrofracking operation disrupted this idyllic image, and the 
once-picturesque town became synonymous with images of flaming tap water.16 
A water well explosion caused by methane buildup in the wellhead spurred the 
first Dimock suit.17 A subsequent investigation by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection revealed dangerous levels of other chemicals also 
present in the Dimock groundwater and soil.18  
Nearly forty families sought redress by filing suit against Cabot Oil and 
Gas Corp. (“Cabot”), the operator of nearby gas well drilling and hydrofracking 
rigs.19 The plaintiffs alleged that Cabot’s fracking operation caused the contami-
nation, and asserted causes of action including strict liability, negligence, private 
nuisance, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and gross negli-
gence.20 Over the next seven years, all but two of the original plaintiffs settled 
with Cabot.21 The two remaining plaintiffs pushed along to trial and in early 
2016 their case, Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., became one of the first hydro-
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Friedlander, supra note 6, at 17, 20. 
 12 David Dekok, Pennsylvania Fracking Trial Begins, Pitting Families Against Driller, REUTERS 
(Feb. 23, 2016, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pennsylvania-fracking-idUSKCN0VW296 
[https://perma.cc/8N4Q-NW8C]. 
 13 See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-CV-2284, 2016 WL 590370, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 
12, 2016) (“This case has been pending for 2276 days.”); Amended Complaint at 3–7, Fiorentino v. 
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 506 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (No. 3:09-cv-02284-TIV), 2010 WL 
931974 (listing numerous plaintiffs, residents of Dimock, in the Amended Complaint against Cabot 
Oil & Gas Corp.); Dekok, supra note 12 (stating that nearly forty plaintiffs had sued over contaminat-
ed drinking water and nearly all had settled out of court). 
 14 Ellen Cantarow, Shale-Shocked, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/ellen-cantarow/marcellus-shale-fracking_b_1223903.html [https://perma.cc/Y99U-ATHJ]. 
 15 See Cantarow, supra note 14; SUSQUEHANNA CTY., PA., 101 Things to Do in Susquehanna 
County, http://susqco.com/tourism/101-things-to-do-in-susquehanna-county/ [https://perma.cc/3USD-
BQJT]. 
 16 Judge Denies Lone Pine Order in Dimock Fracking Case Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 33 
WESTLAW J. ENVTL. *1, *1 (2012); Cantarow, supra note 14. 
 17 Tom Wilber, $4.2M Fracking Verdict in Pennsylvania Favors Families Against Driller, PRESS 
& SUN BULL. (Mar. 11, 2016, 2:03 PM), http://www.pressconnects.com/story/news/2016/03/10/pa-
families-win-4-million-verdict-against-gas-driller/81605868/ [https://perma.cc/8Q53-4DJP]. 
 18 See Amended Complaint, supra note 13, at 16. 
 19 See id. 
 20 Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 508 (M.D. Pa. 2010). 
 21 Dekok, supra note 12. 
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fracking suits alleging water contamination to reach a jury.22 The lengthy and 
difficult narrative of the Ely litigation showcases the obstacles facing those who 
seek justice following a hydrofracking disaster.23 
This Note will suggest an additional avenue of redress for plaintiffs, like 
those in Dimock, against fracking operations.24 Plaintiffs who suffered harm by 
fracking operations may be able to succeed in suing the government for its role 
in allowing the various harms caused by fracking.25 Though such a strategy has 
not yet been utilized in a fracking contamination case, the government—
specifically the state government and the administrative body that issues hydro-
fracking permits—faces potential liability under an inverse condemnation theo-
ry.26  
The doctrine of inverse condemnation arises out of the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, which states that no property may be taken by the gov-
ernment without compensation.27 If a government action is deemed to rise to the 
level of a taking, then the affected individual can file an inverse condemnation 
suit, compelling the government to provide recompense for the impact of the 
action.28 This is potentially useful in a groundwater contamination case, like the 
one in Dimock because it provides a new, untested avenue of redress for those 
injured by a fracking operation.29  
In such a case, where the groundwater contamination interrupts an individ-
ual’s ability to consume well water or irrigate a commercial farm, the plaintiff 
could logically allege that the government interfered with the plaintiff’s property 
rights by granting a permit to operate a hydrofracking rig.30 Although the gov-
ernment was not the direct cause of the interference with the plaintiff’s property 
rights, case law suggests that the government’s role in permitting such activity is 
a sufficient link and thus rises to the level of a compensable taking.31 
Part I of this Note presents a background on the practice of hydraulic frac-
turing, including a historical overview and a breakdown of the technical pro-
cess.32 It then explores the myriad environmental risks associated with this fossil 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Dekok, supra note 12; Wilber, supra note 17. 
 23 See Fiorentino, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 508; Dekok supra note 12. In 2016, after seven years of litiga-
tion, the remaining Dimock plaintiffs won a four million dollar judgment; however, this kind of trial 
victory is exceedingly rare. See David Dekok, Pennsylvania Famiies Win $4.2 Million Damages in 
Fracking Lawsuit, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2016, 2:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/pennsylvania-
fracking-idUSL1N16I1VC [https://perma.cc/GW7B-PMHS]. 
 24 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see infra notes 105–155 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 105–155 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 189–215 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 43–75 and accompanying text. 
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fuel extraction technique.33 Part II provides a legal background.34 First, it exam-
ines the laws that enable hydrofracking, including state-run permitting pro-
grams.35 Second, it analyzes how hydrofracking fits in a broader web of federal 
environmental statutes and highlights the explicit loopholes in environmental 
statutes that make it more difficult for an individual harmed by a fracking opera-
tion to seek redress in a court.36 Part II then introduces the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and provides background on inverse 
condemnation jurisprudence.37 Part II concludes with an examination of the re-
quirements of standing, focusing on the three elements established by the Su-
preme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.38 
Part III of this Note proposes that individuals impacted by a hydrofracking 
disaster sue the government permitting agency for its role in allowing the place-
ment of the hydrofracking operation.39 Part III examines the likelihood that such 
a case would succeed in court.40 It first examines standing and then discusses the 
merits of an inverse condemnation claim.41 Finally, Part IV explores the poten-
tial impact that a successful inverse condemnation suit would have on the hydro-
fracking industry.42 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE MECHANICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF  
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
A. What Is Fracking? 
Hydraulic fracturing (“hydrofracking” or “fracking”) was developed in the 
1940s and for the last seventy years has been utilized to some extent by energy 
companies across the globe to extract natural gas from deep beneath the surface 
of the earth.43 The technique did not assume its modern form until the 1990s 
with the development of horizontal drilling.44 By directing wells laterally after 
first drilling straight down to the target depth, hydrofracking operations are able 
to fracture a much larger area of shale rock, and therefore are able to procure 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See infra notes 51–75 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 76–223 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 86–104 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 105–155 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 156–223 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 224–273 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text. 
 43 Emily C. Powers, Note, Fracking and Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach That 
Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 913, 919 (2011); Lauren Etter, No 
Fracking Way: Towns Across the Country Are Stopping the Big Energy Industry from Its Controver-
sial Effort to Dig for Natural Gas, AM. B. ASS’N J., Nov. 2014, at 47, 48. 
 44 Powers, supra note 43, at 919. 
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more natural gas.45 With each rig made more productive by this technological 
advancement, hydrofracking is more profitable than ever before resulting in the 
rapid proliferation of fracking operations across the United States.46 
The modern hydrofracking process begins by drilling a well down into the 
earth.47 Typically, the drillers direct the well horizontally and then inject the well 
with highly pressurized fluid; this fluid causes the surrounding subsurface rock 
to crack and release natural gas that has been trapped beneath the earth’s sur-
face.48 The driller then injects the well with chemically treated sand or clay—
known as proppants—to physically keep the newly formed fractures open, al-
lowing the escaping gas to flow freely.49 The natural gas flows out with immense 
pressure back up through the wellhead, where it is collected.50  
B. The Environmental Consequences of Fracking 
Though supporters praise hydrofracking as the future of American energy, 
its viability comes at a severe environmental cost.51 Every step in the life cycle 
of a fracking operation risks triggering environmental disasters, such as radiation 
leaks, exploding water wells, poisoned groundwater, and earthquakes.52 The 
very act of drilling the well produces a potentially dangerous waste product.53 
The drill cuttings, along with a lubricating chemical mud, can contain unsafe 
levels of radioactive material.54 Despite this danger, fracking operations often 
collect and store waste in open ponds or truck them to ordinary landfills.55 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See id. at 921. 
 46 See Monika Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive Response to Opposition 
Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States, 46 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 423, 425 (2014); Golden & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 957–58; Powers, supra note 43, at 921. 
 47 Coman, supra note 4, at 134. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Ehrman, supra note 46, at 433; Coman, supra note 4, at 134. 
 50 Ehrman, supra note 46, at 433; Coman, supra note 4, at 134. 
 51 See Ehrman, supra note 46, at 427, 468; Coman, supra note 4, at 135; David Giller, Note, Im-
plied Preemption and Its Effect on Local Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J. L. & POL’Y 631, 
631 (2013). 
 52 See Coman, supra note 4 at 135; Steve Krejci, Note, Is the Human Right to Water in Pennsyl-
vania Fracked? An Analysis of the Pennsylvania Right to Water in the Hydraulic Fracturing Context 
and a Proposal for Reform Based on French and Ontario Environmental Rights Statutes, 8 APPALA-
CHIAN NAT. RES. L.J. 175, 175–76 (2014); Samuel C. Stephens, Comment, Poison Under Pressure: 
The EPA’s New Hydraulic Fracturing Study and the Case for Rational Regulation, 43 CUMB. L. 
REV. 63, 68, 70 (2013); Jeff McMahon, Fracking Truck Sets Off Radiation Alarm at Landfill, FORBES 
(Apr. 24, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2013/04/24/fracking-truck-sets-off-
radiation-alarm-at-landfill/#37e3fe403fb3 [https://perma.cc/SW48-EM9S]; Peter Moskowitz, Utah 
Fracking Fine Highlights Wastewater Pond Threat, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 31, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/31/fracking-wastewaterutah.html [https://perma.cc/79HZ-
YS2U]. 
 53 Stephens, supra note 52, at 71; McMahon, supra note 52. 
 54 McMahon, supra note 52. “Drill cuttings” are a mixture of lubricating mud and the physical 
waste brought up from the underlying strata as the drill cuts into the earth. Austin C. Whitmore, Note, 
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In 2013, for example, a disposal truck carrying drill cuttings from a hydro-
fracking facility in Pennsylvania triggered a radiation alarm at a local landfill.56 
The landfill could accept some amount of slightly radioactive material, but the 
truck’s contents exceeded that threshold by a factor of ten.57 Further inspection 
revealed the cuttings emitted gamma radiation from radium 226 at a rate eighty-
four times higher than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard for 
harmful air pollution.58 Inhalation of radium 226, a naturally occurring isotope, 
is known to increase the risk of cancer in all tissues and organs, even at low lev-
els of exposure.59 Radium 226 is especially prevalent in the drill cutting byprod-
ucts taken from the Marcellus shale region, a 104,000 square mile natural gas 
deposit stretching across New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.60 
Hydrofracking also creates a very real possibility of water contamination.61 
Many of the compounds used in injection fluids and proppants are toxic or car-
cinogenic.62 Likewise, methane and natural gas can be released from the rock 
after fracturing and escape uncontrolled.63 These toxins have the potential to 
leach into and contaminate groundwater.64 Though proponents of hydrofracking 
often diminish the likelihood of groundwater contamination, such occurrences 
are not uncommon.65 
For instance, in 2006, a blown hydrofracking gas well in Clark, Wyoming 
released over seven million cubic feet of methane, contaminating nearby 
                                                                                                                           
Oilfield Recycling in Texas: Why Command and Control Regulations are Stifling the End Goal, 44 
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 290 (2014). 
 55 McMahon, supra note 52; Moskowitz, supra note 52. 
 56 McMahon, supra note 52. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Elisabeth N. Radow, Homeowners and Gas Drilling Leases: Boon or Bust?, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 
J., Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 10, 12; McMahon, supra note 52; Susan Phillips, Fracking’s Other Danger: 
Radiation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 25, 2013, 7:43 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/
2013/01/25/frackings-other-danger-radiation/ [https://perma.cc/BB8T-U785]. 
 61 Coman, supra note 4, at 135, 137; Jacqueline Quarré, Comment, Defending Water Against a 
Fractured Body of Law: A Case Study of California’s Monterey Shale Formation, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 443, 444, 447 (2014). 
 62 See Coman, supra note 4, at 135, 137; Quarré, supra note 61, at 447. 
 63 Derrick Howard, Hydraulic Fracturing in the Appalachian Basin: Incorporating Environmen-
tal Justice to Regulate Natural Resource Exploration, 7 APPALACHIAN NAT. RES. L.J. 113, 131 
(2013). 
 64 See id. 
 65 See Blake A. Watson, Fracking and Cracking: Strict Liability for Earthquake Damage Due to 
Wastewater Injection and Hydraulic Fracturing, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 3 (2016) (as-
serting hydrofracking’s “relatively low risk to water supplies”); Quarré, supra note 61, at 444, 447 
(describing the frequency of water contamination caused by fracking in California, highlighting a 
massive spill in excess of ninety-six million gallons). 
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groundwater with benzene and other hydrocarbons.66 A similar tragedy befell 
Dimock, Pennsylvania in 2009, when high levels of combustible gas leaked into 
groundwater and caused a water well to explode.67 Investigators found that the 
leaking fracking rig also contaminated the drinking water with threatening levels 
of arsenic, barium, glycol compounds, manganese, phenol, methane, and sodi-
um.68 
Hydrofracking operations also have the potential to contaminate surface 
water, either from accidental spills or by intentional discharge of waste fluid.69 
Surface pollution can leach into the soil and potentially travel to the subsurface 
water table, compounding the risk of compromising drinking water.70 
There is also a growing concern about fracking’s contribution to seismic ac-
tivity.71 The fracturing process itself can trigger a seismic event, though these 
events are usually insignificant.72 Of greater concern is the disposal of fracking 
wastewater through underground injection, a common technique whereby drill-
ers deposit wastewater into underground strata of porous rock or soil.73 Re-
searchers linked one such disposal well to a five-point-seven magnitude Okla-
homa earthquake in 2011, the largest in the state’s history.74 
Other environmental concerns from hydrofracking include air pollution 
from methane and volatile organic compounds, high emissions of greenhouse 
gases that contribute to climate change, worker exposure to volatile compounds, 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Timeline for Cleanup from Clark Gas Well Blowout Accelerated, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Feb. 27, 
2008), http://trib.com/news/breaking/timeline-for-cleanup-from-clark-gas-well-blowout-accelerated/article_
b86afdb7-38e1-55df-972f-341122197a5f.html [https://perma.cc/YG9Q-5F4Z]. 
 67 See Tom Wilber, The Promise of Fracking: Lessons from Pennsylvania, PRESS & SUN BULL., http://
www.pressconnects.com/story/news/local/fracking/2015/11/23/promise-fracking-lessens-pennsylvania/760
52604/ [https://perma.cc/67LC-GC8R]. 
 68 See Memorandum from Richard M. Fetzer, On-Scene Coordinator, E. Response Branch, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency to Dennis P. Carney, Assoc. Div. Dir., Hazardous Site Cleanup Div. (Jan 19, 
2012), https://www.epaosc.org/sites/7555/files/dimock-action-memo-01-19-12[1].pdf [https://perma.
cc/4D7V-VQT3]. 
 69 See Howard, supra note 63, at 131 n.91, 134; Alex Wayne & Katarzyna Klimasinsk, Public 
Health Effects of Fracking Need Study, CDC Scientist Says, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 5, 2012, 12:01 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-04/health-effects-of-fracking-for-natural-gas-
need-study-says-cdc-scientist [https://perma.cc/VVV4-EGK5]. 
 70 See Howard, supra note 63, at 134; Moskowitz, supra note 52. 
 71 See Howard, supra note 63, at 136–37. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See Ehrman, supra note 46, at 462; Underground Injection Control (UIC), ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/uic/general-information-about-injection-wells [https://perma.cc/RC3F-
3XCH]. 
 74 See Katie Keranen et al., Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between 
Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake, 41 GEOLOGY 699, 699 (2013); Michael Wines, 
Oklahoma Recognizes Role of Drilling in Earthquakes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/2015/04/22/us/oklahoma-acknowledges-wastewater-from-oil-and-gas-wells-as-major-cause-
of-quakes.html [https://perma.cc/LGL2-9N6N]. 
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and the clear-cutting of trees by developers preparing a site for rig construc-
tion.75 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Legislation and Laws Enabling Fracking 
Hydraulic fracturing (“hydrofracking” or “fracking”) is mostly regulated at 
the state level.76 Most states follow a standard base model involving drilling 
permits issued by a state-level regulatory authority, whereas other states take a 
different approach and regulate at a more local level.77 These jurisdictional var-
iations have created a veritable patchwork of regulation.78  
 The most common version of the permitting process requires an operator to 
first apply for and receive a preliminary permit to drill an exploration well.79 If 
the site is viable, then the initial permit can be converted into a full mineral well 
permit, and the operator can complete construction of the rig onsite.80 Generally, 
this process cuts out public participation and requires no public notice.81 In fact, 
in some states, the permit itself omits details about the placement and operation 
of the gas well, ostensibly to protect the trade secrets of the driller.82 Under these 
circumstances, the surrounding community is left unaware that a fracking opera-
tion is planned until the drillers commence construction of the rig.83 Though 
most states allow for appeal of a permitting decision before a board, they limit 
the right to appeal to owners and operators of hydrofracking rigs; third parties, 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Valerie J. Brown, Putting the Heat on Gas, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A 76, A 76 
(2007); Michael Goldman, Drilling into Hydraulic Fracturing and Shale Gas Development: A Texas 
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like affected community members, have no standing to challenge a board’s deci-
sion to grant a permit.84 This further blocks the public’s ability to intervene in the 
early stages of hydrofracking, limiting it to after-the-fact litigation.85 
B. Statutory Exemptions and Legal Challenges to Fracking 
Ordinarily, an industry that utilizes hazardous compounds and produces 
hazardous waste would fall within the regulatory web of environmental statutes 
in the United States.86 The “iron triangle” of friendly lawmakers, however, has 
carved out a haven, for the oil and gas industry.87 In fact, many of the flagship 
environmental protection statutes explicitly exempt hydrofracking and other pe-
troleum extraction operations from their respective purviews.88 These exemp-
tions, paired with political industry pressure, make it exceedingly difficult to 
bring a hydrofracking operation to task.89  
The loopholes stem from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”), which 
amended a number of existing environmental statutes.90 The most critical 
amendment was to the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), a law passed to pro-
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tect public drinking water and both surface and ground sources of water.91 Sig-
nificantly, the SDWA contains the Underground Injection Control Program, 
which regulates the operation of underground injection wells through a permit-
ting scheme.92 The EPAct carried a targeted amendment for the SDWA, specifi-
cally excluding the injection of fluids during a hydrofracking operation from the 
definition of “underground injection.”93 
The EPAct amendments also carved out petroleum industry protections in 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the legislation that requires 
federal agencies to conduct an environmental assessment before engaging in any 
major action that could affect the environment.94 NEPA further requires an agen-
cy to prepare an environmental impact statement, if the first assessment indicates 
any potential environmental consequences.95 The EPAct, however, created a re-
buttable presumption that certain activities conducted by the oil and gas industry 
are categorically exempt from NEPA and do not require an environmental im-
pact statement.96 
The EPAct amendments also included an attempt to exempt certain petrole-
um activities from coverage under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which outlaws 
the unpermitted discharge of pollutants into waterways.97 Specifically, language 
in the EPAct exempted oil and gas construction activities from the CWA’s per-
mitting scheme that regulates storm water runoff.98 The National Resource De-
fense Council successfully limited this exemption in 2008 by challenging a rule 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) supporting the ex-
emption.99 
Additionally, pro-petroleum exemptions protect hydrofracking operations 
from other statutes.100 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), for example, explicitly excludes natural 
gas liquids from its definition of hazardous waste.101 Other loopholes are more 
implicit.102 For instance, hydrofracking has avoided coverage under the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”) by staying off 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (explicitly exempting fracking activity from the SDWA 
definition of “underground injection”); Kron, supra note 90, at 610 (describing the legal background 
and mechanics of the fracking exemptions of the SDWA). 
 92 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1). 
 93 Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii); Coman, supra note 4, at 138–39. 
 94 42 U.S.C. § 15942 (2012). 
 95 Id.; Brady, supra note 86, at 10. 
 96 42 U.S.C. § 15942; see Brady, supra note 86, at 10. 
 97 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); Brady, supra note 86, at 7–8. 
 98 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 526 F.3d 591, 594 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 99 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 526 F.3d at 594. 
 100 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2012). 
 101 See id. 
 102 See Brady, supra note 86, at 6–7. 
66 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:55 
the list of covered industries.103 If included on the coverage list, EPCRA would 
compel a hydrofracking operation to inform the public of the presence of haz-
ardous chemicals in the community, and establish an emergency plan in the in-
stance of contamination.104  
C. Inverse Condemnation Law 
Inverse condemnation is rooted in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits state and federal governments 
from taking private property for public use without just compensation.105 The 
Fifth Amendment acts as a limit on the government’s inherent police power.106 
While the government has the power to seize privately owned property and con-
vert it for public use, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that 
the property owner must be fairly compensated for the seizure.107 This principle 
is also known as the doctrine of eminent domain.108 The Takings Clause protects 
not only physical property, but also private economic interests or advantages.109 
If a governmental body has taken property, physically or otherwise, but has not 
compensated the property owner for the taking, the owner may bring an action 
for inverse condemnation in an effort to compel the government to provide com-
pensation.110 
Inverse condemnation also extends to government actions that do not rise to 
the level of a physical seizure.111 If government action is so onerous that it 
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amounts to a physical taking of one’s property, then the affected individual is 
still due just compensation.112 The government action in this type of inverse 
condemnation case is often characterized as a “regulatory taking.”113 The con-
cept was first established in the early twentieth century in the landmark United 
States Supreme Court case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.114 In Pennsylvania 
Coal, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania law that prohibited subsurface coal 
mining that triggered subsidence of surface land.115 The Court held that the regu-
lation effectively made it illegal to mine coal in the manner that the plaintiff coal 
company envisioned because the mine in question was only suitable for extrac-
tion that triggered land subsidence.116 The Court in Pennsylvania Coal did not 
create an explicit test, but rather framed the issue as a broader question of de-
gree, asking if the regulation goes “too far.”117 
Since the Court in Pennsylvania Coal first recognized inverse condemna-
tions as a cause of action in 1922, courts and scholars have struggled to establish 
a clear rule for when a government action rises to the level of compensable tak-
ing.118 Despite the lack of an explicit standard, the Supreme Court has adopted a 
series of tests and considerations to determine when a regulation goes too far so 
as to become a taking.119  
 Government actions are per se takings under the Fifth Amendment, and 
thus automatically warrant compensation, where the action in question requires 
the property owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of the property.120 
The Court established this rule in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., reasoning that permanent invasions of property rights resemble physical 
seizures of property, regardless of the economic impact on the individual.121  
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 In 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Su-
preme Court addressed this question of economic denial directly.122 The Court 
held that a reviewing court should consider: (1) the economic impact of the gov-
ernment action on the landowner; (2) the extent to which the action interferes 
with investment-backed expectations; (3) the character of the action; and (4) the 
extent to which the interference can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
the government.123 Under Penn Central, government action may also amount to 
a per se taking where it completely deprives an owner of all economic beneficial 
use of the property.124 Actions that impact a landowner but leave some economic 
use are not per se takings, but may still rise to the level of compensability if they 
meet certain criteria.125 As a result, the Court has established that a land use reg-
ulation warrants compensation when it denies a landowner economically viable 
use of the property.126 
No single Penn Central factor is controlling.127 Instead, courts consider the 
four factors in totality, and then weigh the individual’s interest against that of the 
government.128 Though the Penn Central test is mathematically imprecise, its 
factors allow courts to tackle the broad question of when a government action 
goes too far.129  
For a court reviewing a government action under the first Penn Central fac-
tor, the mechanics of the economic impact inquiry are self-explanatory.130 Gen-
erally, a court will assess the extent to which the plaintiff was monetarily 
harmed.131 Put simply, the greater the economic impact of a governmental ac-
tion, the greater likelihood of success of a takings claim.132 A government action 
that eliminates all beneficial use of a property is a per se taking, and automatical-
ly warrants compensation.133 Something short of a total taking would be subject 
to an economic calculation to determine the magnitude of the loss, comparing 
the value that has been taken with the value remaining in the land.134 
 For the second factor in a Penn Central analysis, the question of invest-
ment-backed expectations overlaps significantly with an inquiry into the eco-
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nomic impact on the property owner.135 The question of expectations bolsters the 
economic question.136 In other words, the economic impact will be more signifi-
cant if the plaintiff’s expectations of maintaining property rights were reasona-
ble.137 
 The third Penn Central factor, the nature of the action, or character of the 
action, explores the government’s interest.138 This factor essentially weighs the 
policy behind the government action against the damage it has done to the indi-
vidual.139 If the government has a weighty interest compelling its action, the 
court is less likely to find a compensable taking.140 What constitutes a weighty 
interest is up for debate and often political.141 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, found in favor of compen-
sation when a county ordinance required a church to move its campground out of 
a floodplain.142 While the state conservation interest in Bragg was fairly typical, 
the government’s interest in First English Evangelical illustrates the outer 
bounds of the Penn Central test.143 In First English Evangelical, the Court held 
that the government’s interest in protecting disabled children from drowning still 
did not outweigh the economic impact to the church that had to relocate its 
camp.144 The holding reflects a strong reluctance by the judiciary to interrupt a 
private property interest without compensation, even when the motivation for the 
government’s action is significant.145  
Similarly, in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg, the Texas Court of Ap-
peals found that the state interest in preserving water during a drought was not 
significant enough to overcome the economic impact to an individual farmer.146 
Bragg presents an archetypical fact pattern of a modern regulatory takings ac-
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tion.147 In Bragg, the Edwards Aquifer Authority, a Texas state agency, imple-
mented a water-permitting scheme to combat drought conditions.148 They issued 
water-use permits to well owners, capping the volume one could pump from the 
eponymous aquifer.149 The plaintiffs, husband and wife pecan farmers in Central 
Texas, contested their water use permit.150 The Braggs argued that the cap 
amount, based on one’s previous maximum water use, was inappropriate be-
cause pecan trees require more and more water as they mature.151 When the Ed-
wards Aquifer Authority denied their request for an increased cap, the Braggs 
filed suit alleging an invalid regulatory taking of their pecan orchards.152 In 
2013, the court found for the Braggs, holding that the partial denial of the re-
quested water permit amounted to a compensable taking of property and ordered 
the Edwards Aquifer Authority to compensate the Braggs for the loss of their 
orchard.153 Applying Penn Central, the court in Bragg found that the economic 
impact of a water use regulation warranted compensation partly because the 
plaintiff’s expectations of unencumbered access to groundwater were reasona-
ble.154 The court found that these expectations were reasonable because the 
plaintiff farmer had a graduate degree in agriculture.155  
D. Standing 
As a threshold matter, for an action to succeed, the plaintiff must have 
standing to sue.156 Generally speaking, standing is a question of whether the liti-
gant is entitled to have the dispute heard and decided by a court.157 The standing 
requirement arises out of broad constitutional principles.158 Though the U.S. 
Constitution makes no explicit mention of standing, the Supreme Court has used 
the language of Article III to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and 
controversies.159 This requirement prevents the judiciary from offering un-
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prompted advisory opinions that might encroach on the enumerated powers of 
the other branches of government.160 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court articulated the specific 
requirements for standing.161 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia outlined 
three elements of standing that a plaintiff must show in order to have the right to 
make a legal claim and seek judicial enforcement.162 First, the plaintiff must 
have suffered an injury in fact.163 This injury in fact must be a “concrete and par-
ticularized” invasion of a legally protected interest.164 Moreover, the injury must 
be actual or imminent, and not merely hypothetical.165 Second, there must be a 
link of proximate causation between the plaintiff’s injury and the allegedly 
wrongful conduct by the defendant.166 In other words, there can be no standing 
to sue for the actions of a third party not before the court.167 Third, it must be 
likely that a favorable holding by the court will redress the injury alleged.168 
In the complaint, standing needs only to be supported by generally alleged 
facts.169 By the summary judgment phase, the presumption of validity shifts, and 
plaintiff must show specific evidence to support assertions of standing.170 When 
challenging a government action, a plaintiff may have standing even if the plain-
tiff is not the object of that action.171 Though, as a rule, standing is still available 
in such a case, it is not easy to meet the standing requirement in that situation.172 
1. Injury in Fact 
In Lujan, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not show a sufficient con-
crete injury in fact and thus dismissed the case for lack of standing.173 The plain-
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tiffs sought to challenge a decision by the Secretary of the Interior (“the Secre-
tary”) not to extend the purview of Endangered Species Act to foreign nations.174 
The plaintiffs asserted that the Secretary’s actions would increase the rate of ex-
tinction of endangered species around the globe.175 Plaintiffs further argued that 
this injured them because they had studied and observed certain endangered spe-
cies abroad in the past and would potentially study other endangered species 
abroad in the future.176 The Court held that this alleged injury to their hypothet-
ical intentions was insufficient because it was too speculative and unspecific.177 
Likewise, the Court dismissed their assertions of an “ecosystem nexus”—that 
connected and granted standing to all parts of a contiguous ecosystem—because 
it was overbroad.178 The Court further clarified that for an injury to be sufficient 
for standing it must be concrete and either actual or imminent.179 
Concrete, as used in this context, does not necessarily mean physical or 
tangible, and many things can constitute an injury in fact.180 The stigma of repu-
tational harm, for example, is inherently abstract and intangible, yet courts con-
sistently hold that it is concrete enough to satisfy the this standing require-
ment.181 In contrast with Lujan, such an intangible harm satisfies the injury in 
fact requirement because its effects are presently real.182 Conversely, the envi-
ronmental nexus harm proposed in Lujan was hypothetical and speculative and 
because it had not yet occurred the Court found that there was no injury.183  
In an environmental case where an actual injury has already occurred, the 
court is far more likely to find an injury in fact sufficient to create standing.184 
For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc., the Court found that an environmental group had standing to sue a 
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wastewater facility because its members suffered a concrete injury.185 In Friends 
of the Earth, the defendant wastewater facility had been discharging mercury 
into the nearby North Tyger River, and the plaintiffs alleged that this discharge 
impacted their ability to use and enjoy the waterway.186 The defendant asserted 
that the plaintiffs had suffered no medical harm, and had no physical injuries; in 
fact, the only harm the plaintiffs alleged was an interference with their ability to 
fish, swim, picnic, and watch birds by the river.187 Nonetheless, the Court found 
that these injuries were concrete enough to create standing because, although 
they were intangible, they were not overly speculative because they had already 
occurred.188 
2. Causation Fairly Traceable to Defendant 
In Lujan, the Court established a second standing requirement: that the cau-
sation of a plaintiff’s alleged injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s ac-
tions.189 The fairly traceable standard allows standing even when the defendant 
did not directly trigger the injury in question.190 Inverse condemnation suits that 
arise out of airplane flight paths near residential property are illustrative of this 
idea.191 For example, in Thornburg v. Port of Portland, the plaintiffs owned a 
home approximately one mile from the end of a runway at Portland International 
Airport.192 Though the plaintiffs did not live directly under the flight paths of 
arriving and departing aircraft, their proximity to the airport caused them to hear 
significant noise and in their suit they claimed that the noise from the planes 
amounted to a taking of their property.193 Thus, they filed suit seeking compen-
sation for the taking.194 The Oregon Supreme Court held in favor of the plain-
tiffs, finding that the city government direction of the airport amounted to a 
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.195  
In Thornburg the court made three main points.196 First, the court held that 
regular and continuous airplane noise can constitute a nuisance, even absent 
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physical trespass over the plaintiff’s property.197 Second, the court reasoned that 
unchallenged nuisance activity can ripen into an easement granting the offending 
party the right to continue that activity indefinitely.198 Finally, the court held that 
the creation of an easement is, on its face, a taking of property.199 Thus, the court 
reasoned that the noise from arriving and departing planes rose to the level of a 
physical taking by the government.200  
The court in Thornburg relied on a United States Supreme Court decision 
issued earlier that year, Griggs v. Allegheny County.201 In Griggs, the Court held 
that the invasion of property rights—specifically, a plane flying over an individ-
ual’s home—could ripen into an easement to continue that activity and that the 
government actor, and not the airline, was the appropriate defendant in a takings 
suit.202In Thornburg, a private third-party actor—a private airline—caused the 
direct interference—the noise nuisance—with the plaintiffs’ use of their land.203 
The government actor, the city through its the public airport, merely facilitated 
and oversaw the placement of the contested activity, the flight patterns.204 Yet, 
the court in Thornburg imputed liability to the city government and found that 
the disturbances to plaintiff’s property amounted to a compensable taking.205 
The court held that a nuisance persistently committed by a private party, could 
ripen into a prescription, and when a government actor maintains that nuisance, 
it amounts to the taking of an easement.206 
Likewise, in Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, the highest state court in Maryland, found a sufficient 
causal link between state and county governments and water contamination to 
grant county residents standing in an inverse condemnation suit.207 In Litz, the 
plaintiff, Gail Litz, owned a parcel of lakefront land that she used to operate a 
commercial campground.208 The nearby town lacked a dedicated sewer system, 
so residents relied on individual septic systems.209 Over time, seventy to eighty 
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percent of these septic systems failed, and human waste drained into the lake 
abutting the plaintiff’s land.210 This contamination diminished the plaintiff’s 
ability to derive income from her campground, she subsequently fell on difficult 
financial times, and her property was foreclosed.211 
Litz, brought an inverse condemnation action against the state environmen-
tal regulatory agency and the county health department, asserting that their fail-
ure to regulate the septic system cut off her ability to use and enjoy her proper-
ty.212 The trial court dismissed the case, and the appellate court affirmed the dis-
missal, in part because the government took no affirmative action that could be 
linked to contamination.213 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
versed and remanded, holding that mere government inaction may be enough to 
create a taking. 214 As this case law demonstrates indirect involvement, like the 
flight path orchestration in Thornburg, or even inaction, as in Litz, may be suffi-
cient.215 
3. Redressability 
The third Lujan standing requirement, redressability, mandates that a court 
can only grant standing if it is likely that a plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by 
a favorable decision of the court.216 This is a practical inquiry that considers the 
remedies available in a given action.217 Simply put, the redressability require-
ment asks if the remedies available to the plaintiff would actually ameliorate the 
alleged harms.218 The plaintiffs in Lujan failed on this requirement; the Court 
reasoned that the injunction requested would not solve the plaintiff’s alleged 
problems and therefore the plaintiffs’ injuries were not likely to be redressed.219 
In contrast with the holding in Lujan,  a court is more likely to find the re-
dressability requirement satisfied when a plaintiff employs a cause of action 
more clearly related to his or her injury.220 For example, in National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit found that the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) had standing to bring an action to block a proposed New Jersey stat-
ute that would expand legalized sports gambling.221 As applied in NCAA, the 
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redressability inquiry is a common sense question: does the proposed remedy 
actually solve the plaintiff’s alleged problem?222 The court held that the redress-
ability requirement was satisfied because the proposed remedy—an injunction 
against the wagering statute—logically solved the reputational injury alleged.223  
III. INVERSE CONDEMNATION IN A FRACKING GROUNDWATER 
CONTAMINATION CASE 
In Dimock, Pennsylvania, a hydraulic fracturing (“hydrofracking” or frack-
ing”) rig operated by Cabot Oil and Gas (“Cabot”) caused a dangerous leak of 
methane gas.224 This combustible gas bubbled into the substrate and permeated 
the surrounding aquifer where local residents of Dimock draw their drinking 
water.225 By 2009, Dimock’s well water was so contaminated with methane that 
it could be ignited with a match.226 After a water well explosion and an investi-
gation by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, approxi-
mately forty residents filed suit against Cabot, asserting a bevy of common law 
tort and contract claims.227 Over the next seven years of litigation nearly all of 
the plaintiffs settled out of court.228 Their struggle begs the question: could they, 
and other similarly situated plaintiffs, have increased their odds of success by 
adding another cause of action to their arsenal and another defendant to their 
complaint?229 Would it have been useful for the Dimock plaintiffs—and useful 
for future hydrofracking groundwater contamination plaintiffs—to sue the gov-
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ernment body that granted the fracking permit under an inverse condemnation 
theory?230 
A. Standing 
In potential litigation resulting from groundwater contamination, like the 
litigation that followed the Dimock fracking disaster, a plaintiff is likely to satis-
fy the requirements for standing.231 First, the plaintiffs must show injury in 
fact.232 If the intangible harm of a losing one’s picnicking grounds was concrete 
enough to satisfy the first standing requirement in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., then the significant physical injury 
of exploding wellheads or poisoned drinking water is likely to pass, as well.233 
Moreover, the injury in a well water contamination case impacts property val-
ues.234 This financial harm is likely to constitute an injury in fact because it is 
quantifiable, and not hypothetical235 Similarly, the requirement of redressability 
is easily satisfied because the injury is largely based on financial impact to prop-
erty values, it is redressable via remuneration.236 
At first glance, the requirement that the injury be fairly traceable to the de-
fendant seems more problematic for an inverse condemnation suit filed after a 
hydrofracking rig contaminates groundwater.237 The governmental defendant—
for instance, the state government and the body that issues hydrofracking per-
mits—would likely argue that because these entities did not directly trigger the 
harm, the link between its actions and the injury are too tenuous.238 In other 
words, the government may assert that it should not be held responsible because 
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a private third-party actor caused the direct interference with plaintiff’s enjoy-
ment of the property.239 The government actor merely facilitated and oversaw 
the placement of that private actor’s activity.240 
This argument is implicitly dispatched in the common law.241 An analogous 
fact pattern exists in a string of inverse condemnation cases arising out of public 
airport activity.242 If a court overlays the facts of a groundwater contamination 
case, like the one in Dimock, to the reasoning in Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 
it should reach a parallel conclusion.243 In Thornburg, a private third-party actor, 
a private airline, caused the direct interference, the noise nuisance, with the 
plaintiffs’ use of their land.244 The government actor, the city through the public 
airport, merely facilitated and oversaw the placement of that activity, the flight 
patterns, that created the noise.245 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Oregon in 
Thornburg imputed liability to the city government and found that the disturb-
ances to plaintiff’s property amounted to a compensable taking.246 In Dimock, 
the fracking operation caused the direct interference with plaintiff’s property use, 
but the government through the permitting board, facilitated and oversaw the 
placement of that activity.247 Thus, the Thornburg court’s reasoning could logi-
cally extend from airport noise inverse condemnation to hydrofracking inverse 
condemnation.248 
Alternatively, the government may argue that it cannot be held responsible, 
because granting a permit is not an affirmative enough action to warrant liabil-
ity.249 Additionally, the government may assert that it was not in a position to 
foresee the contamination because it was a passive actor.250 These defenses, 
however, hold little water.251 In Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environ-
ment, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that even government inaction 
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could carry inverse condemnation liability.252 Moreover, the court in Litz found 
the question of foreseeability off-point and did not entertain it.253 This, paired 
with the clear injury in fact, redressability, and the causal link supported by the 
analogy of airport inverse condemnation law establishes standing for the plain-
tiff, even in a stricter federal venue.254 Though Litz and Thornburg are state court 
cases, the constellation of law they create would be persuasive in other jurisdic-
tion because they are a proper readings of Supreme Court case law and con-
sistent with public policy.255 
B. Government Liability Under an Inverse Condemnation Theory 
In determining if the government action was greater than is constitutionally 
permissible, a court will apply the Penn Central test.256 The precise application 
of this test is fact-specific and thus is often difficult to predict in a hypothetical 
scenario.257 Using the Dimock facts—where a hydrofracking rig contaminated 
groundwater with methane and other chemicals, causing a wellhead to ex-
plode—an action for inverse condemnation could have the potential for suc-
cess.258 
It is possible that fallout from a hydrofracking catastrophe would not deny 
a resident all use of his or her property, and thus it would not qualify as a total 
taking.259 Instead, the economic impact of these injuries would be subject to a 
financial calculation to determine the magnitude of the loss by comparing the 
value that has been “taken” with the value remaining in the land.260 If groundwa-
ter contamination prevents an individual from using the land as a commercial 
farm, the economic loss is likely significant.261 Whether it is significant enough 
to warrant compensation is difficult to predict because application of the test has 
been inconsistent.262 For example, the Court’s decision in Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, held compensation was not warranted even though the property in question 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See id. 
 253 See id. 
 254 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. It is worth noting that Thornburg and Litz are both state court 
decisions, and as such, they hold persuasive, but not binding, authority in a federal jurisdiction. See 
Litz, 131 A.3d at 932–33; Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 110. 
 255 See Litz, 131 A.3d at 932–33. 
 256 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 143–44 (1978). 
 257 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618. 
 258 See id.; Dekok, supra note 12; Wilber, supra note 17. 
 259 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Echevarria, supra note 130, at 
10474. 
 260 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Echevarria, 
supra note 130, at 10474. 
 261 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 497; Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 
S.W.3d 118, 143–44 (Tex. App. 2013); Echevarria, supra note 130, at 10474. 
 262 See Belza, supra note 153, at 215; Wade, supra note 135, at 10936. 
80 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:55 
decreased in value by approximately eighty-seven percent, but in a similar case 
the Supreme Court of Texas decided that twenty-five percent diminution in value 
is sufficiently impactful to require compensation.263 The success of a plaintiff in 
a groundwater contamination suit will be very dependent on the specific facts of 
the case.264 
The analysis of a plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations is also very 
fact-sensitive.265 Considering again a commercial farm, if the plaintiff could as-
sert that he or she reasonably expected to be able to continue using groundwater 
to irrigate the property’s commercial crops, the plaintiff might also be able to 
support the reasonableness of that expectation with evidence of an agricultural 
degree, years of farming experience, or a written business plan for her opera-
tion.266 
The third Penn Central factor, the nature of the government action, is likely 
the most problematic for a plaintiff in a groundwater contamination case.267 This 
factor essentially weighs the individual’s private property rights against the gov-
ernment’s interest in acting as it did.268 This might pose an obstacle in a hydro-
fracking groundwater contamination case, considering the iron triangle of poli-
tics and industry money surrounding hydrofracking in many states.269 In most 
states, the government defendant would assert that it had a vital economic inter-
est in supporting the hydrofracking industry.270 That being said, the importance 
of the government’s interest has been increasingly eroded over the years of Penn 
Central jurisprudence.271 Thus it is plausible—if not likely—that a court would 
not place great weight on the government interest behind the character of the 
regulation in a hydrofracking water contamination case.272 This, paired with the 
clear, severe economic impact on the plaintiff and the interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations, make it equally plausible that a plaintiff would suc-
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ceed in characterizing the damage to the property as a taking, securing compen-
sation for the harm.273 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
There is a general danger that a successful inverse condemnation case in 
the context of hydraulic fracturing (“hydrofracking” or “fracking”) could expand 
the availability of inverse condemnation actions.274 Through this cause of action, 
government actors could theoretically be held liable for the effects that permit-
ting activities have on communities, not just the applicant.275 As takings actions 
become more prevalent, the government’s ability to govern and regulate effec-
tively is undermined by the repeated need to defend its actions in court.276 This 
general theoretical risk does not outweigh the potential impact inverse condem-
nation liability would have on the hydrofracking industry.277 
The fact that state actors may potentially face liability for permit granting 
activity has enormous implications, both long term and immediate.278 First, the 
chance (or the fear) of paying for a fracking operation gone wrong will immedi-
ately influence the permit granting procedure.279 With the threat of liability, a 
state regulatory agency that issues permits will likely be more discerning in mak-
ing permit determinations.280 The specter of liability may compel these agencies 
to conduct more thorough investigations into company practices and perfor-
mance history.281 In order to avoid liability, proactive agencies might adopt more 
robust monitoring activities to curb risky behavior and prevent contamination.282 
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This external regulation, in turn, incentivizes petroleum companies to proactive-
ly police themselves, which in turn could raise the standard of fracking safety in 
the United States.283 Alternatively, if a state chooses not to respond affirmatively 
with regulation and oversight, it may simply grant fewer—if any—permits.284 
The cost of compliance, paired with the overall chilling effect of states not 
granting permits, would cut into the industry’s bottom line.285 This would wors-
en the already tenuous position of hydrofracking gas in a market flooded with 
cheaper Middle Eastern crude oil.286 
CONCLUSION 
Communities impacted by the environmental and public health conse-
quences of hydraulic fracturing find themselves with a limited legal toolkit. They 
cannot utilize landmark environmental statutes, like the Safe Drinking Water Act 
or the Clean Water Act, because a powerful web of industrial and political inter-
ests has undercut the citizen enforcement provisions of these laws. Common-law 
tort actions against hydrofracking operations likewise find little success. Poten-
tial plaintiffs could increase their likelihood of victory, however, if they also lev-
eled an attack on the government. State regulatory agencies could face liability 
for granting a fracking permit to a rig that ends up contaminating the surround-
ing groundwater under an inverse condemnation theory. In short, the govern-
ment’s act of granting a permit, and thus orchestrating the placement of the 
fracking rig, interfered with residents’ use and enjoyment of their property. 
Though there is a causal gap between the government’s actions and the direct 
interruption of property rights, specifically water contamination, courts have 
found agencies liable under comparable circumstances. Thus, the government 
could be Constitutionally compelled to compensate the individuals for the dam-
age done to their property interests. 
Regulatory agencies that fear liability for granting a permit would increase 
monitoring and regulation, and they would likely grant fewer permits overall. 
This oversight could very likely decrease the chance of an environmental hydro-
fracking disaster, and also have the side effect of chilling the growth of an indus-
try that is already on economically thin ice. 
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